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ABSTRACT
A model of the determinants of worker preferences for union
representation as distinct from their actual union status is developed and
estimated using data from the Quality of Employment Survey. In order to
implement the model, a pair of econometric issues were addressed. First, the
worker preferences were available only for nonunion workers. After
correcting for this censoring, it was found that preference for union
representation was higher among the workforce in general than among the
nonunion workforce. In addition, preferences for representation vary much
more by worker characteristics among the workforce in general than they do
among the nonunion workforce. This is undoubtedly due to sorting based on
worker preferences. The second problem regarded proper estimation of the
union-nonunion wage differential, which was hypothesized to be a positive
determinant of worker's preferences for union representation. Three
different measures were used and, while there was some variation between
them, they all showed a similar relationship with worker preferences.
*This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant
No. SES-7924880. The author also received support as an Alfred P. Sloan
Research Fellow.
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I . Introduction
A relatively neglected area of research on labor unions is the
determination of the union status of workers. In order to understand the
process through which labor unions developed, what their future holds, and
what their effects on workers, the workplace, and compensation are, it is
crucial that a thorough understanding of this issue be gained. In most
studies which develop structural models of the determination of the union
status of workers (e.g., Ashenfetter and Johnson, 1972; Lee, 1978), it is
argued that union status is determined strictly as a result of worker
preferences for unionization. However, as Kochan and Helfman (1981) point
out, this is only part of the story. A worker's preference for a unionized
job will only translate into such a job if a unionized employer is willing to
hire that worker, and it is likely that there will be excess demand for
vacancies in existing union jobs . -^ Hence, the employer's criteria for
selection of workers from the queue need to be modeled along with worker
preferences in order to model adequately the determination of union status.
Abowd and Farber (1982) attempt an analysis of the determination of a
worker's union status in which a distinction is drawn between worker
preferences and employer choice criteria. However, their analysis is
hampered by the fact that only the final outcome (union status) is observed,
and it is impossible to determine whether nonunion workers did not want a
union job, could not get a union job, or both. This difficulty is compuonded
by the problem that a worker's current preference for a union job, given
Worker Preferences -2- Henry S. Farber
accrued seniority, may be different than it was at the time the worker took
his current job. For example, a nonunion worker with ten years seniority may
not want a union job even if one were offered at that point. However, the
worker may have preferred a union job ten years earlier but was not offered
one.
In this study, a rather unique data set is employed which can be used to
identify for nonunion workers their preferences for unionization holding
seniority fixed. Thus, one-half of the process through which worker union
status is determined can be investigated. However, these data do not permit
investigation of the employer selection process, and a satisfactory solution
of the entire puzzle must await future research.
In the next section, a simple structural model of worker preferences for
unionization is developed based on utility maximization by individual
workers. Section III contains a discussion of the data set from the 1977
Quality of Employment Survey (QES) developed by the Survey Research Center at
the University of Michigan. Particular attention is paid to the
interpretation of the question, "If an election were held with secret
ballots, would you vote for or against having a union or employees'
association represent you?" The response to this question (VFU) serves as
the basis for the analysis of this study.
Empirical implementation of the model developed in Section II is
hampered by two problems. First, the crucial question (VFU) was asked only
of nonunion workers. Analysis of the responses in this context is
interesting in that insight can be gained into the characteristics of
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nonunion workers which lead them to desire union representation conditional
on their nonunion status. However, for an analysis of preferences for union
representation unconditional on union status, the data are censored on the
basis of an obviously related variable. An econometric model which takes
account of this censoring and yields consistent estimates of unconditional
preferences for union representation is developed in Section IV,
The second problem which hampers the empirical implementation of the
model is that a crucial element of the structural model is the union-nonunion
wage differential (AW) facing a worker. Potential problems of sample
selection bias in estimating AW, while solved from a technical standpoint,
are notoriously difficult to handle in a convincing fashion from a practical
point of view. ^ For this reason, the analysis of the structural version of
the model is deferred until a later section, and a reduced form version of
the model is derived in Section IV which does not require estimates of AW.
This reduced form model is then estimated in Section V both with and without
accounting for the censored sample problem noted above. The estimates
suggest that preferences for union representation among the nonunion
workforce are relatively flat across most individual characteristics, while
among the workforce as a whole there are sharp distinctions. This result is
due to sorting in the sense that many workers who desire union representation
on the basis of both their observed and their unobserved characteristics are
already working on union jobs, leaving a group of nonunion workers whose
preferences for union representation show little systematic variation with
characteristics.
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In Section VI, separate union and nonunion earnings functions are
estimated by a number of different techniques in order to derive estimates of
AW for the structural version of the union preference model. First, ordinary
least-squares (OLS) estimates are derived. However, these are potentially
biased and inconsistent due to the fact that the sample censoring of wage
rates based on union status may be correlated with the wage differentials.
A not completely satisfactory attempt to account for this sample selection
bias is made by estimating the union and nonunion earnings functions by two
additional methods. The first of these is to use OLS augmented by the hazard
rate (inverse Mill's ratio) derived from a reduced form probit union status
model. This technique is described by Lee (1979). The second method is to
estimate a maximum likelihood switching regression model consisting of the
union and nonunion earnings functions plus an equation explaining union
status. The union-nonunion wage differentials implied by these various
methods are then evaluated and compared but, while the results differ, it
cannot be concluded that any particular measure is clearly superior.
In Section VII the structural version of the preferences for the union
representation model is estimated both conditional on nonunion status and
accounting for sample censoring. All three measures of AW derived in
Section V are used due to the ambiguity concerning the correct measure, and
the results are compared. The results are remarkably similar, particularly
in light of the substantial differences m the estimated wage differentials.
Overall, the analysis in this section confirms the predictions of the theory
developed in Section II in that a positive, though insignificant, relation-
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ship is found between AW and worker preferences for union representation.
The final section of the paper contains a synthesis of the results along
with conclusions which can be drawn from the analysis.
II. A Simple Model of Worker Preferences for Union Representation
At its simplest level, a worker's preference for union representation on
a job versus no such representation can be modeled as a comparison by the
worker of the utilities yielded to him by his job in each case. His
preference will be for that case which yields him the largest utility.
A worker's utility on the job is affected by many factors, including wages,
fringe benefits, safety, job security, comfort, etc. In addition, there are
subjective factors such as satisfaction with supervision, perceived fairness
of treatment, equitable comparisons with others, perceived chances for
promotion, etc. In the absence of explicit measures of most of these factors
for each worker in both a union and a nonunion environment, it is argued that
these utilities vary across workers as functions of their personal and
occupational characteristics as well as the measurable characteristics of the
union and nonunion jobs
.
In order to examine this argument more carefully, assume, as is done
below, that the only explicit job characteristic which can be measured for
each worker in both a union and a nonunion context is the wage rate. More
formally, it is argued that
(1) V = V (Z,W )
u u u
and
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(2) V = V (Z,W )
n n n
where V and V represent the worker's union and nonunion utilities
u n
respectively, Z represents a vector of personal and occupational
characteristics, and W and W represent the worker's union and nonunion wage
' u n "
rate respectively. The worker's preference for union representation can be
expressed by computing y = V - V . If this difference in utilities (y) is
positive, then the worker will opt for union representation. If y is
negative, then the worker will not opt for union representation. It is clear
that this difference in utilities can be expressed as
(3) y = y(Z, W , W ) ,
^
-^ u n
where variations in Z measure variations in the difference between the
worker's union and nonunion utilities.
Examples of such variations are not hard to come by. For instance, it
is well known that fringe benefits are substantially more generous on union
jobs in such dimensions as medical insurance, pensions, and vacation pay.'*
Those workers who place a greater value on these fringe benefits are more
likely to have a positive y and hence desire union representation. For
example, older workers are likely to value their potential pension benefits
more than younger workers, while workers with young families are likely to
value medical insurance relatively highly. In another dimension, the
prevalence of layoff by inverse seniority rules in unionized establishments
may lead workers with relatively more seniority to desire union
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representation due to the increased job security such seniority confers in
union settings.
In order to derive the empirical analog of this model, a specific
functional form must be selected for y. This is
(4) y = ZY + 5(ln W - In W ) + e
,
•' u n -t
where y is a vector of parameters, 6 is a paremeter expected to be positive,
and e represents unmeasured components of the utility difference. Clearly,
if V, Z, W , and W were observable for all workers, the parameters in^
'
' u ' n
> f
equation (4) could be estimated using straightforward linear methods.
However, this is not the case, and the discussion turns to an examination of
the data and their limitations.
III. The Data
The data used are from the 1977 cross-section of the Quality of
Employment Survey (QES) developed by the Survey Research Center of the
University of Michigan. The QES contains data for approximately 1500
randomly selected workers (both union and nonunion) on their personal
characteristics and job attributes.^ The crucial bit of information for this
study is the response to the question asked only of nonunion workers, "If an
election were held with secret ballots, would you vote for or against having
a union or employee's association represent you?" This variable is called
"Vote-for-union?" or VFU. It is interpreted here as the preference of a
worker for union representation on his current job. Thus, it holds all job
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characteristics fixed except those which the worker expects the union to
affect. It is assumed that the worker's response is based on his current
utility as compared with what the worker's utility is expected to be were the
job to be unionized.
A sample of workers was derived from QES by selecting those workers for
whom the survey contained valid information on the variables listed in
Table 1. Self-employed workers, managers, sales workers, and construction
workers were deleted from the sample. The remaining sample contains 880
workers. Table 1 contains descriptions of the variables used in the study as
well as their means and standard deviations for both the entire sample and
the union and nonunion subsamples. The base group for the dichotomous
variables are white, nonsouthern, single, male blue collar workers with
twelve years of education. On average, the 37 percent of the sample who are
unionized are slightly older, earn substantially more, have somewhat more
experience, and are more likely to be male, married, nonwhite, nonsouthern,
and in a blue collar occupation.
Thirty-eight percent of the nonunion sample expressed a preference for
union representation (VFU =1). It is unfortunate that the analogous
question was not asked of union members (If an election were held by secret
ballot, would you vote to continue union representation?). This would make
information available for all workers about worker preferences for
unionization of their current job at the current time.^ The lack of this
information poses some important problems of econometrics and interpretation.
It is to this and related problems that the next section is addressed.
Table 1. Means (Standard Deviations) of Data
Quality of Employment Survey, 1977
Description Combined Union Non-Union
(Dichotomous variables Sample Sub-Sample Sub-Sample
Variable = otherwise) (n=880) (n=327) (n=553)
U = 1 if works on union job .372 — —
VFU = 1 if desires union represent. — — .376
Age age in years
Exp labor market experience in years 16.9
Sen firm seniority in years
Fe = 1 if female
Marr = 1 if married w/spouse present
Marr*Fe = 1 if Fe = 1 and Marr = 1
NW = 1 if nonwhite
South = 1 if worker resides in South
Ed < 12 = 1 if <12 years education
12<Ed<16 = 1 if >12 years & <16 years educ
. .213
Ed > 16 = 1 if >16 years education
In(wage) natural logarithm of wage
Cler = 1 if occupation is clerical
Serv = 1 if occupation is service
Prof&Tech = 1 if occupation is professional
or technical
36.4 38.1 35.4
(12.9) (12.5) (13.0)
19.1 15.6
(12.4) (12.4) (12.2)
6.81 9.50 5.22
(7.46) (8.22) (6.45)
.420 .324 .477
.636 .703 .597
.200 .174 .213
.139 .162 .125
.353 .235 .423
.220 .257 .199
.165 .241
.199 .199 .199
1.58 1.83 1.43
(.859) (.983) (.737)
.208 .116 .262
.153 .113 .177
.230 .205 .244
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IV. Econometric Issues and Options
A number of problems arise in the estimation of the parameters of the
worker preference model specified in equation (4). The first problem is that
y, which represents the differences in a worker's utility between union and
nonunion status on the job, is not observed. All that is observed is the
sign of y through the worker's response to the VFU question (y > <=> VFU=1,
y < <=> VFU=0). The limited nature of the dependent variable implies that
Pr(VFU=l) = Pr(y > 0), yielding from equation (4) that
(5) PrCVFU = 1) = Pr(e, > -Zy - 6(ln W - In W )) .
I- u n
If e is assumed to be distributed normally with zero mean and unit variance,
then equation (5) implies a probit specification for a likelihood function.^
The contribution of any individual to the log-likelihood function is
(6) L^ = VFU ln[0(Zy + 6(ln W - In W )))
+ (1 - VFU) Infl - $(ZY + 6(ln W + In W ))1
^ u n '^
where $(•) represents a standard normal cumulative distribution funct ion. ^'^
If all of the elements of equation (6) were observed for all workers, it
would be a straightforward exercise to maximize the appropriate likelihood
function to obtain estimates of Z and y. Unfortunately, our task is not so
simple. As mentioned above, VFU is observed only for nonunion workers. If
the question of interest is the estimation of a model of nonunion worker
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preferences for union representation conditional on their nonunion status and
if the assumption is made that e has a standard normal distribution
conditional on the workers being nonunion, then maximum likelihood estimation
applied to the likelihood function implied by equation (6) over all of the
nonunion workers in the sample will lead to consistent estimates of y 3nd 6.
However, these estimates cannot be interpreted as those which describe a
model applicable to all workers regardless of union status unless a
particular (testable) restriction described below is imposed.
In order to continue the analysis, an empirical model of the
determination of the union status of workers is required. A simple model is
specified of the form
(7) S = Ca + e^
,
where S is an unobservable latent variable determining union status, C is a
vector of worker and job characteristics, a is a vector of parameters, and e„
is a random component with a standard normal distribution which captures
unmeasured aspects of the union status decision. If S is positive, then the
worker works on a union job (U=l), and if S is negative then there is no
union representation on the job (U=0). Thus, Pr(U=l) = Pr(S > 0), which
implies that
(8) Pr(U=l) = Pr(e2 > "Ca) •
Given the normality assumption regarding e , the contribution to the log-
likelihood function regarding union status is a probit of the form
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(9) L2 = U In (-tCCa)) + (1 - U) ln(l - $(Ca)) .
In light of the introductory discussion of the process by which union
status is determined through separate decisions by workers and employers, the
behavioral underpinnings of this probit model are left deliberately vague.
It is to be interpreted as a reduced form empirical relationship describing
the union status of a worker. However, a note of caution is required. It is
difficult (if not impossible) to think of a structural model of the
determination of the union status of a worker where both the worker and
employer make separate decisions which would have a reduced form which could
be described as a simple univariate probit. In fact, this study is
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to model the union status
determination of workers in a manner which is consistent with separate worker
and employer decisions in order to move away from the behaviorally naive
structural model which is implicit in the simple probit model described here.
Nonethless, we continue with the simple probit reduced form representation in
order to continue the analysis m the hope that it is a reasonable
approximation to a reduced form which would be derived from an appropriate
behavioral model.
If the random components in the VFU and U functions (e and e„) are
correlated (e.g, they have a standardized bivariate normal density function
h(£^,e^; P^2^^» ^^^^ estimation of the likelihood of VFU from equation (6) is
incorrect if the goal is to estimate y and 6 for workers unconditional on
their union status. In particular, e was assumed to have a normal
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distribution with zero mean unconditional on union status, but the e are
observed only for nonunion workers. The condition for a worker being
nonunion from equation (8) is that e < -Ca so that e is observed only if
^2 ^ -Ca, and the likelihood must be written in terms of this conditional
distribution. Using Bayes ' Rule and assuming joint normality of e. and e
,
the conditional distribution of e given e < -Ca is
(10) f(e, le^ < -Ca) =
LT '^^S'^2' f'll^'^^l
il 2 ^ ""' $(-Ca)
This conditional distribution is non-normal and involves the parameters a
and p^2-
Two points are worth noting here. First, if e and e are uncorrelated
and so that Pio^Oj then ^ , | ^t '^ ~^^ ^^ distributed as a standard normal and
the likelihood function on VFU implied by equation (6) and estimated over the
sample of nonunion workers can be interpreted correctly as that relevant to
all workers unconditional on their union status. However, it seems likely
that unmeasured determinants of the union status of a worker and of the
worker's preference for union representation are correlated with each other
so that it is unlikely that p ^=0. This potential restriction will be tested
in succeeding sections. The second point to note is that where p ^0, the
conditional interpretation given to the probit VFU likelihood function
derived from equation (6) and the conditional likelihood function for VFU
derived from the bivariate normal model in equation (10) are inconsistent
with each other because f (e | e <-Ca) is non-normal. Nonetheless, estimates
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from the simple probit VFU likelihood function will be interpreted as
estimates of worker preferences for union representation conditional on beinj
nonunion
.
While the appropriate conditional likelihood function for VFU could be
derived from equation (10), a much more efficient approach is to use
information from the whole sample to write the joint likelihood of
preferences for union representation and union status while noting that VFU
is censored for union workers. For nonunion workers who desire union
representation the appropriate contribution to the likelihood function is
Prfe > -Zy - 6(ln W - In W ), e„ < -Caj. Given the distributional
^ i u n "^
assumption, this is
(11) Pr(VFU=l, U=0) = /~^°'/°° b(e^,e2; p)de^de2
where k, = -ZY-6(ln W -In W ). Similarly, for nonunion workers who do not
J- u n
desire union representation, the appropriate contribution is Pr(e < -Zy -
5(ln W - W ), e„ < -Ca], which yields
u n -"^ ^
-Ca ic^
(12) Pr(VFU=0, U=0) = / / b(e^,e2; P)de^de2 .
Finally, for union workers no information regarding VFU is known, so that
Ej^ is integrated out and the contribution of these workers to the likelihood
function is a univariate normal CDF representing Pr(ep>-Ca), which yields
(13) Pr(U=l) = <t>(Ca)
.
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Using these results, the contribution of a worker to the structural
log-likelihood function accounting for the sample censoring is
(14) L = (VFU)(1 - U) In (Pr(VFU=l, U=0)
)
+ (1 - VFU)(1 - U) ln[Pr(VFU=0, U=0)] + U ln(Pr(U=l)]
where the relevant probabilities are defined in equations (11)-(13).
One more hurdle must be overcome before the model can be estimated. Two
important variables required for all nonunion workers are those workers'
union and nonunion wage rates. However, only the nonunion wage is observed,
and a question arises as to how to handle this problem. The difficulty is
that it is likely that the union-nonunion wage differential, and hence the
union and nonunion wage rates, are important determinants of ultimate union
status (in a structural version of the model) as well as of worker
preferences for union representation. This raises potentially serious
problems of selection bias in estimating a union and a nonunion earnings
function which will be addressed in Section VI. In addition, the fact that
the observed nonunion wage is likely to be correlated with union status makes
it improper to estimate the model conditional on this wage rate. The
correlation must be accounted for.
One approach toward solution of this problem is to specify union and
nonunion individual earnings functions as
(15)
In W = XB + e and
u u u
In W = XB + e
n n n
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where X is a vector of exogenous characteristics, g and g are vectors of
u n
parameters, and e and e are normalLy distributed unobserved elements. The
'^
' u n
difficulties stem from the possibility that e and/or e are correlated with
u n
e, and e„. If the representations of In W and In W from equations (15) are12 '^ u n ^
substituted into equation (4), the resulting union-nonunion utility
difference can be expressed as
(16) y = ZY + <Sx(B^ - 6^) + £3
where e^ = £ + <5(g - e ) and is distributed normally unconditional on
3 i u n
union status.
Substituting into equation (6), the individual contribution to the log-
likelihood function for VFU which is interpreted conditionally on nonunion
status is
(17) L, = VFU ln($(ZY + 6x(6 -3 ))1 + (1-VFU) 111(1-0(21 + 6X( 6 -g ))]
i un ^ un'
under the normalization that the variance of e is one.-^^ Similarly, the
relevant probabilities for the joint likelihood function defined in equation
(14) can be rewritten as:
-Ca '^
(18) Pr(VFU=l, U=0) = / / \>Uj^,€^\ Q^^)dz^,dz^
-co K3
and
(19) Pr(VFU=0, U=0) = / / b(e ,e ; p )de d3' 2' "^23 3 2
Worker Preferences -16- Henry S. Farber
where k^ - -Zy-SxCB -g ) and p„_ is the correlation between e„ and e^. The
i u n ^i 2. i
Pr(U=l) is unchanged.
The structure of equation (16) raises some serious identification
problems because only for those elements of Z which are not included in X can
the associated y's be estimated. Similarly, only the product of 6(3 "3 ) can
u n
be estimated, and then only for elements of X which are not included in Z.
What can be identified is a reduced form version of equation (16) which is
specified by substituting Z*y* = Zy + SX(3 -3 ) into equations (16) through
(19). The vector Z* contains all of the variables which are in either Z or
X, and y* is the vector of reduced form coefficients. This reduced form
model is estimated in the next section.
The entire structural model can be identified and estimated by using
data on the union and nonunion wage rates to derive estimates of 3 and 3*="
u n
which can then be substituted into the model to estimate y and 6 conditional
on these estimates of 3 and 3 • However, these is some question as to the
u n ' ^
best technique to estimate these vectors, and three different methods are
used in Section VI. Finally, in Section VII the structural version of the
model is estimated.
V. Estimation of the Reduced Form Model
Substitution of Z*y* for Zy + 6X( 3 -3 ) in equation (17) yields the
u n
reduced form probit contribution to the log-likelihood function for VFU
interpreted conditionally on nonunion status of
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(20) L^ = VFU ln[$(Z*Y*)) + (1 - VFU) ln(l - <I>(Z*Y*) ) .
The vector Z* includes all variables which appear either in the structural
union preference function (Z) or in the earnings functions (X). Those
variables assumed to be in the earnings function are three dichotomous
variables for different levels of education, labor market experience and its
square, seniority with current employer and its square, and dichotomous
variables for nonwhite, female, and Southern residence. The labor market
experience measure is actual years worked for pay since age sixteen rather
than the standard Age-Educat ion-6. The variables assumed to be in the
preference for union representation function (Z) include seniority with
current employer and its square, and the dichotomous variables for nonwhite,
female, and Southern residence. In addition, the Z function includes age,
dichotomous variables for married with spouse present and the product of
female and marital status, and three dichotomous variables for broad
occupational groupings. The union of these sets of variables contains the
sixteen variables plus a constant which make up Z*. All variables are
defined in Table 1 along with their means and standard deviations. The base
group for the sample consists of white, nonsouthern, single males with twelve
years of education working in a blue-collar occupation.
Note that there are two sets of constraints implicit in this
formulation. The first is that five variables are excluded from the
structural VFU function while they are included in the earnings functions.
These are the three education and two experience variables. The set of four
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overidentifying constraints is testable in the structural version, and such a
test is performed in Section VII. -^^ Second, five variables are also excluded
from each earnings function, and these ten constraints are also theoretically
testable. However, as discussed in the next section, difficulties in
estimation and interpretation hinder the actual performance of an appropriate
test.
The estimates derived for y* by maximizing the likelihood function
implied by equation (20) over the 553 nonunion workers are contained in the
first column of Table 2. At first glance the only variable which has a
substantial effect on a nonunion worker's preference for union representation
is race. No other variable is asymptotically significantly different from
zero at conventional levels, and only six of the sixteen coefficients have
estimates whose absolute values exceed their asymptotic standard errors. ^^
While the relationship looks relatively flat, a likelihood ratio test of the
hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the constant equal zero
rejects the hypothesis at any reasonable level of significance. ^^
In order to investigate how sensitive nonunion worker preferences for
union representation are in a number of dimensions. Table 3 contains values
of Pr (VFU=1 I U=0) at the point estimates of the parameters contained in the
first column of Table 2 for 30 year old single males with twelve years of
education, ten years experience, five years seniority, and various
occupations, race, and regions. It is clear that for any occupation and
region, nonwhites are substantially more likely to desire union
representation than are whites. -^^ On the other hand, region has a trivial
Table 2: Estimates of Pr(VFU) and Pr(U)
Univariate and Bivariate Probit Models
Variables
Pr(VFU=l|U=0)
Univariate
(1)
Pr(U=l)
Univariate
(2)
Constant -.151
(.271)
-.0852
(.253)
Ed < 12 .0530
(.172)
.0538
(.133)
12 < Ed < 16 -.190
(.150)
-.0942
(.130)
Ed > 16 .129
(.200)
.231
(.174)
Exp .0142
(.0226)
.0151
(.0194)
Exp2 -.000368
(.000398)
-.000316
(.000331)
Sen .000255
(.0302)
.105
(.0232)
Sen2 -.00143
(.00129)
-.00224
(.000908)
NW .827
(.180)
.295
(.141)
Fe .221
(.197)
-.0513
(.167)
South -.00481
(.118)
-.530
(.102)
Age -.00469
(.0109)
-.0123
(.0104)
Marr -.117
(.180)
.0777
(.142)
Marr*Fe -.273
(.243)
.00253
(.212)
Cler -.154
(.174)
-.738
(.151)
Serv .121
(.181)
-.499
(.144)
Prof & Tech -.209
(.193)
-.656
(.171)
(cont d)
Pr(VFU=l)
Bivariate
(3)
Pr(U=l)
livariate
(4)
.444 -.0933
(.358) (.254)
.0641 .0467
(.150) (.134)
-.187 -.120
(.136) (.129)
.188 .267
(.180) (.172)
.0169 .0147
(.0207) (.0195)
-.000401 -.000336
(.000371) (.000330)
,0431 .110
(.0362) (.0232)
-.00186 -.00239
(.00111) (.000919)
.787 .303
(.192) (.142)
.187 -.0394
(.178) (.168)
-.218 -.547
(.167) (.102)
-.00936 -.0115
(.00994) (.0105)
-.0436 .0789
(.169) (.144)
-.260 -.0331
(.219) (.213)
-.433 -.749
(.209) (.151)
-.128 -.491
(.221) (.145)
-.446 -.719
(.216) (.169)
Table 2 (cont'd)
'23 .778
(.366)
In L -337.8
553
-496.7
880
-833.1
880
(Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.)
Table 3. Predicted Pr(VFU=l) for
Workers Varying by Race, Region, and Occupation
Pr(VFU=l |U=0) Pr(VFU=l)
Non-South South Non-South SouLh
Blue Collar
white .413 .411 .678 .596
nonwhite .728 .726 .894 .848
Clerical
white .354 .352 .511 .425
nonwhite .674 .673 .792 .725
Service
white .460 .458 .630 .546
nonwhite .766 .765 .869 .839
Professional
and Technical
white .334 .332 .398 .350
nonwhite .654 .653 .702 .656
Computed for 30-year-old single males with 12 years education, ten years
experience, and five years seniority. Pr (VFU=1 | U=0) computed from estimates
in column (1), Table 2. Pr(VFU=l) computed from estimates in column (3),
Table 2.
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effect, while the occupational variation is moderate.
The second column of Table 2 contains maximum likelihood estimates over
the sample of 880 workers of the simple probit model of the union status of
workers based on the likelihood function derived from equation (9) where the
vector of variables (C) is the same set as Z*. These are consistent
estimates of the reduced form empirical relationship described earlier and,
given the ambiguity regarding its behavioral underpinnings, not much space
will be allocated to evaluation of these results. Suffice it to say that
nonwhites and nonsoutherners are more likely to be union members, as are
younger workers and those with more seniority . •'° In addition, there are
rather sharp occupational breaks which imply that blue-collar workers are
most likely to be unionized, while clerical workers are least likely, holding
other factors fixed. A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that all
coefficients except the constant term are zero can be rejected at any
reasonable level of significance.^^ This relationship regarding Pr(U) is re-
estimated as a piece of each succeeding analysis and, as is expected, the
results do not change substantially. Hence, no further discussion of Pr(U=l)
will take place.
Estimation of the reduced form joint union preference-union status model
proceeds by substituting Z*Y* for Zy + (5X( 3 -B ) in equations (18) and (19),
yielding
-Ca "
(21) Pr(VFU=l, U=0) =/ / hi£^,c^; P23)degde2
-oo
-z*Y*
and
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-Ca
-Z*Y*
(22) Pr(VFU=0, U=0) = / / h(e^,c^; P23)de3de2
Again, Che Pr(U=l) is unchanged from equation (13). These expressions are
combined with equation (14) to form the appropriate likelihood function. The
maximum likelihood estimates of this model are contained in columns 3 and 4
of Table 2. Note that the estimates contained in the first two columns of
this table relate to a constrained version of the joint model where pp^ = 0.
The estimated value of p is .778 with an asymptotic standard error of .366.
The hypothesis that p^^ ~ ^ ^^'^ ^^ rejected at the 5 percent level of
significance using a two-tailed asymptotic t-test. The asymptotically
equivalent likelihood ratio test can be performed by summing the log-
likelihoods for the first two columns of Table 2 and comparing the
constrained log-likelihood to the unconstrained value. Using this test, the
hypothesis that p = can be rejected at the 10 percent level of
significance. The positive value estimated for p^o suggests that
unobserved factors which make workers more likely to work on union jobs also
make these workers more likely to prefer union representation.
The estimates on the Pr(VFU=l) function unconditional on union status
contained in the third column of Table 2 are much better determined than
those for the conditional model (column 1). While only three of the sixteen
coefficients are significantly different from zero at conventional levels,
fully eleven of the sixteen coefficient estimates exceed their asymptotic
standard error in absolute value. The effect of race on worker preferences
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for union representation is significantly different from zero at conventional
levels, as are two of the three occupational variables. Both clerical and
professional/technical workers are less likely than blue collar workers to
prefer union representation. Southern workers are significantly less likely
at the 10 percent level to prefer union representation than nonsouthern
workers
.
Table 3 contains values of Pr(VFU=l) at the point estimates of y*
contained in the third column of Table 2 for thirty year old single males
with twelve years of education, ten years experience and five years
seniority. The hypothetical worker's occupation, race, and region are varied
in order to investigate the sensitivity of Pr(VFU=l) to these factors. It is
clear that race and occupation have large effects on workers' preferences for
union representation. Nonwhites are substantially more likely to prefer
union representation. Professional and technical workers are the least
likely in terms of occupation to prefer union reprsentat ion, while blue
collar workers are most likely. Southern workers are somewhat less likely
than nonsouthern workers to desire union representation.
It is interesting to contrast the preferences of nonunion workers for
union representation to workers' preferences unconditional on union status.
The calculated probabilities contained in Table 3 facilitate this comparison.
It is clear that workers in general are more likely to desire union
representation than nonunion workers. For example, for the four types of
blue collar workers listed in Table 3 (combinations of race and region), the
probability that workers in general desire union representation is on average
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37 percent higher Chan the probability that workers desire union
representation conditional on being nonunion. The difference is positive but
less pronounced for the other listed occupations. While this result is not
unexpected, there is nothing in the specification which guarantees it, and
finding this result is evidence of the "reasonableness" of the estimates.
Two other differences are that region plays a much greater role in
determining overall preferences for unionization than it does among the
nonunion workforce. In addition, the occupational distinctions are much
greater among the workforce in general than among the nonunion workforce.
These results are doubtless the result of "sorting," and it will be discussed
in more detail below in the context of estimation of the structural model.
VI. Estimation of the Union-Nonunion Wage Differential
In order to estimate the parameters of the structural model, consistent
estimates of the parameters of the union and nonunion earnings functions,
(15)
In W = XB + £ and
u u u
In W = XB + e ,
n n n '
must be derived. However, W is observed only for union workers, while W
u ^ ' r
is observed only for nonunion workers. The reduced form empirical model
which described the union status of workers was specified as
(7) S = Ca + e
Worker Preferences -23- Henry S. Farber
where Pr(U=l) = Pr(S > 0) = PrCe^ > -Ca). It is straightforward to show
that if the random component of the union status decision (e^^ ^s correlated
with the random components of earnings (e and e ), then ordinary least
u n
squares (OLS) applied to the two equations in (15) separately will yield
biased and inconsistent estimates for 6 and g . This so-called sample
u n
selection bias is due to the same sort of data censoring which was described
above in relation to the missing data for union workers on their preferences
for union representation. Given this problem, two alternative estimation
procedures are developed.
The bias is introduced by the fact that the union and nonunion earnings
functions are estimated only over their respective subsamples. This causes
the expectations of e and e to vary by observation because they are only
observed conditionally on union status. More formally, E(e U=l) =
E(e |e > -Ca) and E(e |u=0) = E(e I £„ < -Ca) . If e and £ are not
u ' ^ n
'
n ' .^ u n
independent of e„, then these conditional expectations vary with Ca.
Assuming ioint normality of e , e , and e„ results in
^ -^ ^ u n 2
(23) E(e |e„ > -Ca) = o p„ |^u' ^ u 2u $CCa;
and
(24) E(e |e, < -Ca) = -o p^ J^£^L^
n' 2 n 2n 1 - $(Ca)
where a and a are the standard deviations of e and e respectively, p„
u n u n ^ -^ ' 2u
and p„ are the correlations between c_ and e and between e„ and e
2n 2 u 2 n
respectively, and (j)(«) is the standard normal density function. The
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quantities ^, V and -,—^ . li\ are the "hazard rates" or inverse "Mill's
ratios" of union and nonunion status respectively. They will be called HR
u
and HR .
n
The first approach to consistent estimation of 3 and 3 is a two-step'^'^
u n
"^
procedure described in detail by Lee (1979). Write the earnings functions
conditional on union status as
(25) In W = Xg + (e lU = 1)
u u u
'
and
(26) In W = X3 + (e lu = 0) .
n n n
The conditional error terms can be written as
(27) (e lu = 1) = E(e |u = 1) +
u
'
u
'
u
and
(28) (e lu = 0) = E(e |u = 0) + 9
n
'
n n
where 9 and 9 are random components with zero mean. Substitution for the
u n
error terms in equations (25) and (26) yields
and
(29) In W = X3 + X HR +9
u u u u u
(30) In W = X3 + X HR +9
n n n n n
using the conditional expectations derived in equations (23) and (24) and
the definitions of HR and HR . The parameters X and X represent a p„ and
u n '^ u n u 2u
-a p„ respectively. If HR and HR are observed for union and nonunion
n zn u n
workers respectively, then OLS can be applied to these conditional earnings
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functions, and consistent estimates of 3 , g , X , and X will be obtained.
u n u ' n
Although HR and HR are not observed directly, they are strictly
" u n J > J J
Functions oi Ca, and the latter can be estimated consistently from the simple
probit model of union status derived earlier. The maximum likelihood
estimates of a from the model are contained in the second column of Table 2.
They were used to compute consistent estimates of HR and HR which can then
-^
u n
be used to compute consistent estimates of 3 and g by OLS as described
above.
The second and more efficient approach to consistent estimation of g
u
and g is to derive the likelihood function of the switching regression model
defined by the two earnings functions and the union status function, and to
use the likelihood function to derive the maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters. The contribution to the appropriate log-likelihood function for
an individual is-*-^
(31) L = U Inf r f„ (In W - X g , eJdeJ
^ ^
„ 2u u u u 2. I'
-Ca
+ (1 - U) ln( /"^"f^ (In W - X g , e,)dej
> -•
-oo 2n n n n 2 2^
where f„ (*,*) and f„ (•,•) represent the bivariate normal densities of e.
2u 2n 2
and £ and of £„ and e respectively. The parameters of the model are g ,
g , a, p„ , p„ , a ^, and a ^.
n' 2u 2n u n
The OLS estimates of g and g are contained m columns (1) and (3) of
u n
Table 4. These results are atypical in a number of respects. Although the
average union-nonunion differential computed for these estimates (X(g -g )
)
u n
Table 4. Estimate of Union and Nonunion Earnings Functions
Variable
In W^
(1)
In W^
(2)
In W
n
(3)
In W„
(4)
Constant 1.27
(.175)
1.38
(.331)
1.19
(.0872)
1.24
(.127)
Ed < 12 .0490
(.141)
.0413
(.140)
-.195
(.0796)
-.189
(.076)
12 < Ed < 16 .135
(.151)
.156
(.158)
.184
(.0737)
.177
(.0771)
Ed > 16 .562
(.143)
.573
(.144)
.337
(.0788)
.335
(.0746)
Exp .0480
(.0177)
.0480
(.0173)
.0244
(.00847)
.0243
(.00802)
Exp2 -.000923
(.000346)
-.000905
(.000344)
-.000470
(.000180)
-.000479
(.000171)
Sen .0416
(.0255)
.0343
(.0311)
.0523
(.0144)
.0571
(.0166)
Sen2 -.00150
(.000925)
-.00134
(.000992)
-.00167
(.000623)
-.00177
(.000619)
NW -.337
(.147)
-.352
(.150)
-.175
(.0862)
-.162
(.0854)
Fe -.429
(.114)
-.405
(.128)
-.354
(.0585)
-.371
(.0645)
South .0261
(.123)
.0657
(.157)
.0130
(.0568)
-.00909
(.0726)
««u
-.112
(.283)
HR, -.0911
(.176)
SEE .918
327
.904
327
,652
553
,617
553
HR = Hazard Rate (inverse Mills' ratio) for union workers computed from
estimates in column (2) of Table 2.
HR = Hazard Rate (inverse Mills' ratio) for nonunion workers computed from
estimates m column (2) of Table 2.
The numbers m parentheses are standard errors. These are asymptotic and
corrected m columns (2) and (4).
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is positive (.264), previous evidence and experience with other data sets
suggests that the union earnings function (even conditional on union status)
ought to be flatter in virtually every dimension. ^^^ In addition, the
previous evidence suggests that the unexplained variance in earnings is
larger in the nonunion sector than in the union sector. The common
explanation is that unions standardize wage rates by attaching wages to jobs
rather than to workers. This reduces a union employer's discretion to vary
wges according to individual characteristics. However, the estimates
presented here do not indicate this standardization, and it suggests that
caution be exercised in interpreting the results derived from these data.
Closer examination of the results and comparison with the results
obtained with other data sets suggests that it is the estimates of g which
are "odd" rather than those of B . One approach to solving this problem
might be to use a more "representative" group of union workers. However, the
well known difficulties involved with choice-based sampling preclude such an
approach. Hence, the analysis continues with the current data.^^
Consistent estimates of 3 , 3 , X , and X obtained by applying OLS to
u n' u' n J t-f J b
equations (29) and (30) are contained in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4. The
asymptotic standard errors and the standard error of estimation (SEE) are
corrected through use of the consistent estimates of a ^ and a ^ rather than° u n
those printed by the OLS program. ^^ The first thing to note is that the
estimate of both X and X have relatively large asymptotic standard errors
u n J
o J r
so that, although the hypotheses that A and X are zero cannot be reiected
u n
at conventional levels of significance, it is not possible to determine the
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potential for selection bias very precisely. The point estimates of the
parameter vectors 3 and 3 are virtually identical to those derived using
'^
u n "
OLS without including the "selectivity regressors." The predicted average
union-nonunion wage differential is X( g -3 ) = .325, which is somewhat higher
than that derived using OLS without HR and HR .
u n
The maximum likelihood estimates of the switching regression model
defined in equation (31) are contained in Table 5. The estimates of 3 and
u
3 differ substantially from those contained in Table 4, but the results are,
n
-^ '
if anything, less intuitively appealing than the earlier estimates. The
union earnings function still does not exhibit the sort of standardization of
rates expected of it and, in addition, the average union-nonunion wage
differential is X(3 -3 ) = -1.01. This large negative differential suggests
that an average worker earns in a union job only 36 percent of what could be
earned in a nonunion job. This, of course, does not accord with any
reasonable view of the union-nonunion wage differential debate.
Another somewhat surprising aspect of the results, particularly given
the lack of significance of X and X in the "selectivity regression" model,
are the maximum likelihood estimates of p„ and p„ . These are estimated to2u 2n
be large (.841 and .833 respectively) with very small standard errors (.0272
and .0182 respectively). The hypothesis that both correlations are zero can
be rejected at any reasonable level of significance using a likelihood ratio
test. Note that the estimated correlations are so close to each other as
to be virtually identical. The hypothesis that p^ = p„ cannot be rejected
Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Switching Regression Model
Variable
In W^
(1)
In W^
(2)
Pr(U)
(3)
.438
(.323)
1.50
(.130)
-.155
(.280)
.143
(.288)
-.156
(.109)
.0282
(.149)
-.0327
(.300)
.130
(.111)
-.154
(.149)
.367
(.294)
.359
(.105)
.293
(.172)
,0414
(.0270)
.0247
(.0115)
.0109
(.0198)
-.00101
(.000481)
-.000537
(.000232)
-.000258
(.000358)
.110
(.0480)
.0799
(.0197)
.103
(.0253)
-.00306
(.00183)
-.00215
(.000833)
-.00231
(.00101)
-.313
(.247)
-.0488
(.120)
.231
(.167)
-.654
(.169)
-.453
(.0855)
.250
(.185)
-.265
(.173)
-.142
(.0868)
-.400
(.108)
— —
-.0114
(.0104)
— —
-.00799
(.147)
— —
.150
(.221)
— —
-.314
(.156)
— —
.137
(.153)
~ —
-.481
(.153)
Constant
Ed < 12
12 < Ed < 16
Ed > 16
Exp
Exp2
Sen
Sen^
NW
Fe
South
Age
Marr
Marr*Fe
Cler
Serv
Professional & Technical —
(continued)
Table 5 (cont'd)
P9., = -841
'2u ^2n 533 In L
=
-1417.6
(.0272) (.0182)
a^2 = 1.30
(.101)
0^2 = .564
(.0171)
n = 880
(numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors)
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at any reasonable level of significance using an asymptotic t-test.^^ The
identity of these correlations is what would be expected if the earnings
function errors (e and e ) for any individual were perfectly correlated with
u n
each other. However, in the absence of longitudinal data it is impossible to
identify p , so this must remain conjecture.
' un
Since the estimated wage differential (AW) is what is of importance for
the model of worker preferences for union representation, it is interesting
to compare the three sets of estimates of 3 and g with regard to their
u n
implications of AW. Toward this end, Table 6 contains the coefficients of AW
(S -6 ) for each of the three sets of estimates along with their standard
u n
errors. As expected, the estimates from the OLS and OLS augmented with the
"selectivity regressors" are very similar. The estimates for the maximum
likelihood model differ somewhat from the first two sets, but the major
difference is in the sharply negative constant term. This is what yields the
large negative average differential mentioned above, and it suggests that the
lower average differential estimated using the maximum likelihood estimates
(MLE) is an "across-the-board" reduction rather than associated primarily
with particular groups, although some groups (nonwhites, females, and
southerners) do have lower estimates of 3 - 3 using MLE than using the two
u n
OLS techniques.
Overall, none of the results presented here offers much help in choosing
a "best" measure of AW to use in the structural estimation. The maximum
likelihood estimates are theoretically the best, but the large negative
differentials estimated using MLE are counterintuitive. In addition, the two
Table 6. Estimates of Determinants of AW (g - 3 )
Constant
Ed < 12
12 < Ed < 16
Ed > 16
Exp
Exp 2
Sen
Sen^
NW
Fe
South
AW^ AW^^ AW^
OLS OLS with Hazard Rate MLE
(1) (2) (3)
.080 .140 -1.06
(.20) (.355) (.346)
.244 .230 .299
(.162) (.159) (.292)
-.049 -.021 -.163
(.168) (.176) (.309)
.225 .238 .008
(.163) (.162) (.295)
.0236 .0237 .0167
(.0196) (.0191) (.0282)
-.000453 -.000426 -.000473
(.000390) (.000384) (.000508)
-.0107 -.0228 .0301
(.0293) (.0353) (.0488)
.00017 .00043 -.00091
(.00112) (.00117) (.00188)
-.162 -.190 -.264
(.170) (.173) (.270)
-.075 -.034 -.201
(.128) (.143) (.185)
.0131 .0566 -.123
(.135) (.173) (.184)
Computed from estimates contained in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Computed from estimates contained in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.
Corrected asymptotic standard errors calculated assuming no covariances
between estimates of 3 and B are in parentheses.
u n ^
'^Computed from estimates contained in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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sets of "consistent" estimates are likely to be sensitive to distributional
and other specification assumptions. Finally, the reduced form probit
relationship for union status used in the analysis may be inadequate for the
purpose of correcting for selection bias in wage equations due to its
shortcomings outlined above. Given the lack of a clear guide to the right
set of estimates of AW, the analysis continues using all three measures so
that their performance can be compared.
VII. Estimation of the Structural Model
Given the estimates of AW derived in the last section, the structural
version of the model of worker preference for union representation can be
estimated. This allows estimation of the effects of individual
characteristics on worker preferences after controlling for variation in the
union-nonunion wage differential. Both the model conditional on nonunion
status and the unconditional model are estimated.
Consistent estimates of the parameters of the structural version of the
conditional model can be derived by maximizing the simple probit likelihood
function derived from equation (17) over the sample of 553 nonunion workers.
Unfortunately, the asymptotic standard errors derived from the matrix of
second derivatives of the log-likelihood function are inconsistent in this
case because they do not account for the fact that the predicted wage
differentials are random variables themselves. While it is possible to
derive corrected asymptotic standard errors for these estimates, a more
straightforward technique is to use these consistent parameter estimates as
Worker Preferences -30- Henry S. Farber
starting values for one Newton step on the likelihood function relating to
the overall model consisting of the two earnings functions, the worker
preference function, and the union status function.
The contribution to this log-likelihood function is
(32) L = U ln( / f„ (In W - X B , e,)de,)
•' /jy 11 nil'/ /
-Ca
2u u"u' "l"^--!'
-Ca
+ (1 - U) VFU ln( / / h(e,, e„. In W - X 3 )de.de„)n n 3 2'
-Ca K'
(1 - U)(l - VFU) ln( / / h(e,, e In W - X B )de de„)n n 3 2'
where f. (•,•) represents the bivariate normal density function of £„ and e
,2u ^ n
h(« • •) represents the trivariate normal density function of £,, e^, and e
,
and the quantity <g = -Zy - iSX(3 - B ). For any individual, this^ ' i u n '
contribution represents the joint probability density of observing their
preference for union representation, union status, and wage rate. A critical
element of this likelihood function is the covariance matrix of the four
errors. This is
23
2u
2n
iu
2u
.
2
Of the ten unique elements of this covariance matrix, two (a^ and a ) do3u un
not appear in the likelihood function and hence are not estimable. Two
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elements (a^ and Oj, ) are normalized to one in order to fix the scale of the
probit parameters (C, Yj and 6). This leaves six elements of the covariance
matrix which must be estimated (a„^, o^
,
a„
,
a^
,
a ^, and a ^)
.
^i 3n 2u 2n u n
As it is written, this model is not conditional on nonunion status.
However, given the joint normality of the errors, the conditional model is
equivalent to the constrained version of the joint model where p^, = 0.
Imposing this constraint and taking one Newton step on the entire sample from
the appropriate consistent estimates yields consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimates with consistent asymptotic standard errors. These
estimates of the Pr(VFU) function are contained in Table 7 for the three
different measures of AW.^° Examination of the point estimates of the
structural parameter (6), which is the coefficient of the wage differential,
yields the result that a nonunion worker's union-nonunion wage differential
has a positive effect on preference for union representation. However, the
effect IS not asymptotically significantly greater than zero at conventional
levels of significances for any of the three measures of AW. ^' Given the
large difference between the estimated AW derived from the MLE switching
regression and the other two measures, it is interesting that they yield
roughly the same result. This is likely due to the fact that the major
differences in the three measures of AW lay in the constant term (see
Table 6), and this would explain the differences in the constant term between
the three preference models estimated using the three measures of AW. The
relatively large constant in the AW model is due to the relatively large
negative mean of AW.,, „.° MLE
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The estimates of the other parameters are virtually identical across the
three versions. Nonwhite nonunion workers have a much larger probability of
preferring union representation after controlling for the wage effect of
unions. However, this result must be interpreted with caution due to the
fact that the union-nonunion wge differential is estimated to be smaller for
nonwhites than for whites. This is contrary to previous evidence, which
suggests that nonwhites receive a larger wage advantage than whites from
unionization (Ashenfelter , 1972).
An interesting relationship is found between sex and marital status and
the desire for union representation among nonunion workers. Using the
estimates contained in the first column of Table 7, nonunion single females
are significantly more likely at the twelve percent level to prefer union
representation than are nonunion single males, and they are significantly
more likely at the five percent level to prefer union representation than are
nonunion married males. However, married nonunion females behave in the
opposite manner. Their preferences for union representation is significantly
less than that of nonunion single females at the two percent level. In
addition, the preference of married nonunion females for union representation
does not differ significantly from either single or married nonunion males.
The overident ifying restrictions embedded m the structural model can be
tested by noting that the reduced form estimates contained in column (1) of
Table 2 represent an uncontrained version of the structural model. The
relevant likelihood ratio test has four restrictions (representing the five
variables included in the earnings functions but excluded from the preference
Table 7. Two-Step Estimates of Structural Probit Likelihood Function
on Pr(VFU=l |U=0) with Different Measures of AW
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant -.210
(.389)
-.00173
(.602)
.333
(.537)
Sen .00847
(.0534)
.0116
(.0605)
-.0155
(.0434)
Sen' -.00155
(.00213)
-.00160
(.00217)
-.000875
(.00174)
NW .919
(.323)
.957
(.332)
.973
(.264)
Fe .297
(.246)
.289
(.262)
.348
(.239)
Marr -.104
(.188)
-.0985
(.188)
-.0880
(.188)
Marr*Fe -.272
(.251)
-.272
(.252)
-.313
(.250)
South -.0194
(.189)
-.0389
(.270)
.0392
(.158)
Age -.00882
(.00732)
-.00945
(.00781)
-.00531
(.00618)
Cler -.134
(.173)
-.134
(.174)
-.139
(.177)
Serv .117
(.187)
.105
(.188)
.114
(.194)
Prof & Tech -.186
(.183)
-.186
(.185)
-.0848
(.175)
AW
OLS
.701
(.775)
AW.,
HR
.737
(.794)
AW
MLE
.532
(.487)
In L
(cont 'd)
-338.5 •338.7 -338.7
Notes: Estimates computed by taking one Newton step on full four equation
likelihood function from initial consistent estimates derived
assuming p„, = 0.
Initial consistent estimates of y and 6 were derived by maximizing
the likelihood function in equation (17). Consistent estimates of a
are contained in column (2) of Table 2. An initial consistent
estimate of Pt^j which only appears in the full likelihood function,
was derived by grid search using consistent estimates of the other
parameters. Initial consistent estimates of the other parameters
were derived as follows:
Column 1: Initial consistent estimates of 3^, 3j^, o^^ and a^^ were
computed from the estimates in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4. The
parameters Po,, and P2„ were constrained to zero.
Column 2: Initial consistent estimates of 3^, 3 ^, o^, '^n^ ' ^lu'
and poj, were computed from estimates in columns (2) and (4; of
Table 4.
Column 3: Initial consistent estimates of 3^, 3^^, cf„^> On^' P2u' ^^"^
P2_ were computed from estimates in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.
The values of the log-likelihood function are based on the initial
consistent estimates of Pr(VFU=l | U=0)
.
These estimates are asymptotically efficient. The numbers in
parentheses are asjrmptotic standard errors.
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function less one for AW) . For none of the three measures of AW can the
constrained structural model be rejected at conventional levels of
significance.
°
Consistent estimates of the structural version of the union preference
model unconditional on union status can be derived based on the likelihood
function defined by equations (18), (19), (13), and (14). However, as in the
case described above, the estimated asymptotic standard errors are
inconsistent due to the randomness of the predicted wage differentials.
Asymptotically efficient two-step estimates of the parameters of the
structural model are derived with corrected standard errors by taking one
Newton step on the log-likelihood function defined in equation (32) from the
initial consistent estimates without the constraint that p = 0. These
estimates of the parameters of the Pr(VFU) and Pr(U) functions for the three
measures of AW are contained in Tables 8 and 9.
The estimates contained in Table 7 when combined with the estimates of
Pr(U=l) contained in the second column of Table 2 relate to a constrained
version of the joint model where p„^ = 0. The point estimates, contained in
Table 8, for P23 are all significantly different from zero at conventional
levels so that the constrained model can be rejected. The estimated positive
correlation suggests that workers who are more likely for unobserved reasons
to desire union representation are also more likely to work on a union job.
The central hypothesis of the structural model is that workers with high
union-nonunion wage differentials will be more likely to desire union
representation. While the point estimates of the coefficients of AW are
Table 8. Two-Step Estimates of Structural Bivariate Probit
Likelihood Function on Pr(VFU) with Different Measures of AW
Variable (I) (2) Ci)
Constant .405
(.474)
Sen .0547
(.0593)
Sen2 -.00200
(.00215)
NW .890
(.358)
Fe .260
(.240)
Marr -.0284
(.172)
Marr*Fe -.260
(.223)
South -.247
(.228)
Age -.0131
(.00714)
Cler -.425
(.201)
Serv -.146
(.214)
Prof & Tech -.412
(.201)
^Vs .790(.811)
.545
(.681)
.0530
(.0677)
-.00194
(.00227)
.923
(.373)
.246
(.264)
-.0353
(.171)
-.256
(.223)
-.259
(.298)
-.0133
(.00760)
-.412
(.197)
-.136
(.209)
-.404
(.200)
.874
(.558)
.0213
(.0403)
-.00139
(.00159)
1.04
(.280)
.246
(.241)
-.0499
(.164)
-.285
(.224)
-.139
(.159)
-.00767
(.00600)
-.352
(.164)
-.0591
(.174)
-.225
(.164)
AW,HR .815
(.834)
AW,
MLE .597(.513)
'23 .814
(.323)
.771
(.308)
.654
(.0953)
In L
(cont 'd)
-834.0 -834,2 -834.6
Notes: Estimates computed by taking one Newton step on full four equation
likelihood function from initial consistent estimates derived from
maximizing the likelihood function defined by equations (18), (19),
(13), and (14), and using the appropriate estimate of 3 , 3 , and the
covariance parameters. An initial consistent estimate of P3„, which
appears only in the full likelihood function, was derived by grid
search using consistent estimates of the other parameters. The
numbers m parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
See notes to Table 7 for the sources of the consistent estimates of
3,6, and the covariance parameters,
u' n' ^
Ln L is computed based on the initial consistent estimates.
Table 9. Two-Step Estimates of Structural Bivariate Probit
Likelihood Function of Pr(U) with Different Measures of AW
Variable (1)
AW,OLS
(2)
AWHR
(3)
AWMLK
Constant -.0898
(.258)
Ed < 12 .0856
(.136)
12 < Ed < 16 -.0782
(.130)
Ed > 16 .270
(.180)
Exp .0151
(.0195)
Exp2 -.000319
(.000333)
Sen .111
(.0238)
Sen^ -.00244
(.000935)
NW .297
(.147)
Fe -.0376
(.174)
South -.550
(.103)
Age -.0125
(.0103)
Marr .0738
(.148)
Marr>-Fe -.0276
(.218)
Cler -.746
(.154)
Serv -.493
(.151)
Prof & Tech -.709
(.171)
-.0972
,257)
.0865
.136)
-.0687
.129)
.280
.181)
.0150
.0194)
-.000329
.000326)
.112
.0240)
-.00250
.000940)
.297
.148)
-.0459
.174)
-.552
.103)
-.0121
.0104)
.0666
.148)
-.0215
,217)
-.747
.154)
-.486
.151)
-.725
172)
-.161
.226)
.114
.146)
-.0828
.133)
.198
.171)
.0141
.0173)
-.000362
.000321)
.116
.0243)
-.00265
.000944)
.303
.155)
.439
.150)
-.555
.0973)
-.0108
.00715)
.0638
.126)
.0121
.165)
-.640
132)
-.358
131)
-.578
140)
Note: Estimates of Pr(VFU), P,,, and the value of In L are in Table
notes to Tables 7 and
23 See
n = 880
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positive for all three measures, in no case are they significantly greater
than zero at conventional levels. ^ However, for the AW version the
MLE
coefficient is significantly greater than zero at the ,13 level.
The estimates of the parameters of the Pr(VFU) function are similar
across the three measures of AW. Thus, in order to facilitate the
discussion, only the parameters derived using AW^, „ will be examined
explicitly.
Southern workers are significantly less likely to desire union
representation than are nonsouthern workers at the fifteen percent level.
This contrasts with the result that southern nonunion workers are no less
likely than nonsouthern nonunion workers to desire union representation.
This could explain in part the relatively low level of unionization which
coexists with currently comparable levels of new organization in the two
regions. ^'^ Specifically, the relatively more numerous nonsouthern workers
who desire union representation are already union members, leaving in the
nonunion sector a group of workers who are less likely to desire union
representation and hence comparable to their nonunion southern brethren.
Older workers are significantly less likely to desire union
representation than are younger workers after controlling for seniority.
Marital status has an insignificant effect on male worker's preferences for
union representation. On the other hand, single females are significantly
more likely to desire union representation than are either males or married
females. Married females are indistinguishable from males on this basis.
Sharp occupational distinctions arise in worker preferences for union
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representation. Clerical and professional and technical workers are
significantly less likely to desire union representation than are either blue
collar or service workers. Again, these distinctions do not exist
conditional on nonunion status, and the same sorting argument which was made
above for southern versus nonsouthern workers can be made here.
The overident ifying restrictions used to identify the coefficient of AW
can be tested by noting that the structural model is a constrained version of
the reduced form model whose estimates are contained in Table 2. A
likelihood ratio test of these four overident ifying restrictions fails to
reject the constrained model at reasonable levels of significance.^
Overall, the results concerning the structural model are mixed. For all
three measures of AW, the effect of the wage differential on worker
preferences for union representation is positive but not significantly
greater than zero at conventional levels. However, this may be due more to
imprecision in estimating AW rather than a problem with the structural
specification itself. Evidence of sorting was found in a number of
dimensions, including region, occupation, and age. Among nonunion workers,
little distinction in preferences for union representation could be found
along these dimensions. However, after correcting for the sample censoring
on union status, differences in prefrences were defined quite sharply along
these dimensions.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
A model of the determination of worker preferences for union
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representation was developed which led to the hypothesis of a positive
relationship between a worker's preference in this area and the worker's
union-nonunion wage differential. A distinction was drawn between the
observed union status of workers and their current preferences for union
representation, which was based on costs of job mobility and the existence of
queues for union jobs. A rather unique set of data, the Quality of
Employment Survey, was used because it contained a question the response to
which indicated directly a worker's preference for union representation.
Unfortunately, this particular bit of information was available only for
nonunion workers.
A pair of econometric issues were raised. One had to do with techniques
for handling the censored nature of the union preference information. The
second had to do with appropriate techniques for estimating the central
explanatory variable, the union-nonunion wage differential.
The censored data problem was handled by developing a reduced form
empirical model to explain union status and hence the censoring under the
assumption of joint normality of latent variables determining union status
and preference for union representation. The union preference function was
estimated using both the model conditional on nonunion status and, by
accounting for the censored data, the model unconditional on union status. A
comparison of the general nature of the results both yields some insight into
the determination of the extent and locus of unionization and has important
implications for prospects for organizing currently unorganized workers.
Overall, worker preferences for unionization among nonunion workers are
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rather flat in that there is little variation across workers with different
characteristics. ^ On the other hand, a number of relatively sharp
delinations in worker preferences for union representation along such
dimensions as region and occupation occur in the model unconditional on union
status. This suggests that many workers with those characteristics (both
observed and unobserved) which make them likely to desire union
representation are, in fact, union workers. The nonunion workers who are
left are relatively homogeneous in their lack of interest in union
representation. This interpretation is supported by the positive correlation
estimated between the unobservable factors affecting preference for union
representation and actual union status. In terms of the prospects for union
organizing, this sorting suggests both that current nonunion workers will be
less receptive to organizing efforts and that effective targeting of campaign
efforts on the basis of gross characteristics such as region will not be
terribly useful in light of the flatness of preferences.
The problem of the appropriate estimates of the union-nonunion wage
differential (AW) arose because, as must be true in the absence of
longitudinal data, only one wage or the other is observed for any individual.
Apart from OLS applied separately to the two subsamples, two techniques were
used to derive "consistent" estimates of AW under the assumption of joint
normality of In W and the latent variable determining union status. One
technique (Mill's ratio or selectivity regressors) gave results similar to
the OLS estimates. The other technique (maximum likelihood switching
regression) gave vastly different and unreasonable results in that a large
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negative average differential was predicted. The sensitivity of these
techniques to sample and specification is well known, and as a result the
analysis of the structural model was carried out using all three measures.
The results of the estimation were remarkably similar across all three
measures of AW. The central hypothesis was weakly supported in that the
effect of AW on the propensity to desire union representation was positive in
all cases, though only significantly so in one case. This weakness may be
due to problems in estimating AW rather than to problems with the structural
model
.
In closing, two cautions are necessary. First, all of the results
presented here were derived under the assumption of joint normality largely
for computational convenience. The results may be sensitive to alternative
distributional assumptions. Second, as was discussed earlier, the reduced
form empirical probit model used to explain union status and hence to correct
for sample censoring has rather ambiguous behavioral underpinnings. Indeed,
part of the reason for carrying out this study was to improve our
understanding of union status determination. Some progress has been made but
more is yet to be done.
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FOOTNOTES
1. There is reason to believe that there are advantages to union employment
which are not offset completely by union dues and initiation fees paid
by workers. This results in an excess demand for vacancies in existing
union jobs. See Abowd and Farber (1982) for a more detailed discussion
of this point.
2. See Farber and Saks (1980) for an analysis which focuses on the
preferences of nonunion workers for union representation.
3. See Freeman and Medoff (1981) for a convincing discussion of the
problems with standard sample selection correction techniques in the
union wage effect context.
4. Freeman (1981) presents evidence on the relationship between
unionization and fringe benefits.
5. It must be cautioned that these examples are not meant to imply specific
empirical hypotheses. Any particular personal characteristic can be
correlated with these utilities in a number of dimensions. The effect
of these characteristics in equation (3) is the net effect of all of
these dimensions.
6. See Quinn and Staines (1979) for a detailed description of the survey
design.
7. The question of how workers form their expectations about what unions do
is interesting and important. However, it is left to future research.
Kochan (1979) presents an analysis of worker perceptions of unions based
on the QES.
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8. It is fallacious to argue that since union workers are in fact union
workers voluntarily, they desire union representation. While it is true
that they desired union representation when they took the job in the
sense that it was part of a package of job characteristics which was
preferred to any other package, the accumulation of seniority can reduce
mobility so that a union worker may desire to retain his job but
eliminate unionization. This does not mean that the worker will desire
to quit.
9. The assumption of unit variance is a normalization required by the
dichotomous nature of VFU in order to fix the scale of Y and 6.
10. The identity that $(a) = 1 - <|i(-a) is used in deriving this expression.
11. Note that this is a different normalization than the one used above
(Var(e ) = 1). This will result in a different scaling for the
parameters, but the initial scaling was arbitrary to begin with.
12. The full set is not testable because X must contain at least one
variable which is not contained in Z in order to identify 6. Thus, the
test carried out below embodies only four restrictions.
13. This represents a level of significance of 32 percent with a two-tailed
test or 16 percent with a one-tailed test using an asymptotic t-test.
14. The constrained log-likelihood is -366.1, while the unconstrained log-
likelihood is -337.8. The test statistic is -2(-366.1 - (-337.8)) =
56.8 > 34.3 = x\o05^^^^-
15. Care must be taken in interpreting these results because there is not a
complete analysis of variance. In other words, a complete set of
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interaction variables was not included. The analysis is done because of
the nonlinearity inherent in the relationship between Z*Y* and
Pr (VFU=1 I U=0) and the resulting difficulty in interpreting the parameter
estimates from probit models,
16. The estimated effect of seniority may be more the result of union status
than an explanatory factor. It is well known that seniority is higher
on union jobs through lower quit rates. See Table 1 for union and
nonunion means on seniority as well as Freeman (1980) for an analysis of
the relationship between union status and quit rates.
17. The constrained log-likelihood is -580.6, while the unconstrained log-
likelihood is -496.7. The test statistic is -2(-580.6 - (-496.7)) =
167.8 > 34.3 = x^ 005^^^^-
18. The constrained log-likelihood is -834.5, while the unconstrained log-
likelihood IS -833.1. The test statistic is -2(-834.5 - (-833.1)) =
2.8 > 2.71 = x^ i(l)-
19. See Lee (1979) for a more detailed discussion of this likelihood
function.
20. This can be verified using samples from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), and the Current
Population Survey (CPS). See, for example, Bloch and Kuskm (1978) and
Abowd and Farber (1982).
21. See Webb and Webb (1920) for a classic discussion of the standard rate.
22. See Cosslett (1981) and Manski and Lerman (1977) for discussions of the
choice-based sampling problem.
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23. The technique for deriving the consistent estimates of a ^ and a ^ is
u n
described by Lee (1979). Briefly, the estimated residuals in each
sector are regressed on a constant and the appropriate hazard rate
multiplied by the estimated Ca. The estimated constant terms are
consistent estimates of the residual variances.
24. The constrained log-likelihood, derived from the OLS estimates of 3 and
B and the simple probit estimates of a, is -1470.0. The unconstrained
log-likelihood is -1417.6. The test statistic is
-2(-1470.0 - (-1417.6)) = 104.8 > 10.6 = x^ 005^^^*
25. The quantity p„ - p„ = .008 with an asymptotic standard error of2u 2n
.0313. The t-statistic is .256, which is marginally significant only at
the 60 percent level.
26. See the note to Table 7 for sources of the initial consistent estimates
of the parameters in each of the three cases.
27. It is interesting that examination of the inconsistent asymptotic
standard errors derived from the initial consistent estimates suggests
that for all three measures of AW the effect of the wage difference on
Pr(VFU) is significantly greater than zero at the .06 level. Since
these estimated standard errors would be correct under the assumption
that the estimated differentials were in fact the actual differentials,
this implies that the lack of precision in estimation of AW is what is
causing the relatively large standard errors on 6.
28. The unconstrained model has a log-likelihood of -337.8. The three
versions of the constrained model have log-likelihoods computed using
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the initial consistent estimates of -338.5, -338.7, and -338.7. The
test statistic is minus twice the difference in the log-likelihoods,
which yields values of 1.4, 1.8, and 1.8. The critical value of a x^
distribution with four degrees of freedom at the .75 level of
significance is 1.92. This test is not strictly valid due to the
unaccounted-for randomness of AW. However, the results are suggestive.
29. Once again, the inconsistent standard errors were small enough to allow
rejection of the hypothesis that the coefficient of AW equals zero at
the five percent level of significance. This suggests that it is the
imprecision in the estimation of AW which is the cause of the relatively
large standard errors. See footnote 27.
30. Evidence from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1975, 1978) and from
the National Labor Relations Board (1974) indicate that 1.2 percent of
nonunion workers in the south were eligible to vote in NLRB-supervised
representation elections in 1974. Outside the southern region, only 0.9
percent of nonunion workers were eligible to vote in such elections.
(Eligibility refers to working in a potential bargaining unit where an
election was held.) Of those workers who voted, 46 percent of workers
in the south voted for union representation compared with 50 percent of
nonsouthern workers. Similarly, union representation rights were won in
46 percent of the southern elections and in 51 percent of the
nonsouthern elections. In both regions approximately .3 percent of
nonunion workers were newly organized in 1974 as a result of NLRB-
supervised elections.
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31. The unconstrained model has a log-likelihood of -833.1. The three
versions of the constrained model have log-likelihoods computed from the
initial consistent estimates of -834.0, -834.2, and -834.6. The
likelihood ratio test statistics are 1.8, 2.2, and 3.0. The critical
value of a x distribution with four degrees of freedom at the 50
percent level is 3.36. This test is not strictly valid due to the
unaccounted-for randomness of AW. However, the results are suggestive.
32. An exception to this is that nonunion nonwhites are substantially less
likely than nonunion whites to desire union representation.
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